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Economic Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth: Lessons for Africa and other 
Developing Regions and Economies in Transition 
 
  
I. Introduction 
 
The most pressing concern for policymakers in developing countries is designing and 
implementing policies that raise the quality of life for the majority of their citizens within the 
context of severe resource constraints.  Quality of life, generally measured by various proximate 
indicators such as life expectancy, health status, nutritional adequacy, infant and maternal 
mortality, and various other measures of human capital, is highly correlated to a country’s 
income, poverty and the quality of institutions. By and large, developing countries are 
characterized by weak institutions, low growth and poverty all which translate into low levels of 
human development. The multiplicative effects of these outcomes result in poverty traps that are 
extremely difficult to break out of. This state of affairs has forced governments to embark on a 
wide range of reforms in their institutions of governance and economies with the goal of 
achieving economic growth. 
 Over the last four decades or so, there have been significant institutional and economic 
reforms in developing countries.  Institutional reforms have focused on the introduction of 
political competition by shifting from military and single party regimes, strengthening the 
institutions of governance through adoption of democratic constitutions and instituting 
mechanisms for improved accountability and transparency. These reforms have been 
instrumental in expanding the democratic space and to an extent have reduced conflict situations 
that have in the past undermined development in a large number of countries.   Likewise, 
virtually all developing countries have instituted wide ranging macroeconomic and sectoral 
reforms—agriculture, trade, financial sector, monetary and fiscal policies, public sector reforms, 
etc.  These reforms have largely been in response to dismal economic performance, instability 
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and associated outcomes such as poverty, high and unsustainable deficits, inflation rates, etc. 
The primary object of economic reforms has therefore been the achievement of high and 
sustained economic growth. Reforms translate into economic growth by establishing conducive 
environment for saving and investment, risk taking, providing incentives to producers, creating 
certainty in markets, increasing the size of markets by removing barriers to international trade, 
improvements in competitiveness, removing barriers to entry, etc.  By and large, economic 
reforms are meant to lower the transactions of engaging in productive activities or the cost of 
doing business. Public sector reforms support economic growth by increasing the efficiency of 
government spending decisions and removing artificially created barriers that impede market 
transactions. 
 The emphasis on reforming economies to achieve high rates of economic growth is largely 
motivated by the fact that economic growth associates with lower poverty rates and 
improvements in the quality of life generally. Reforms that result in high rates of economic 
growth are therefore expected to result in substantial poverty reduction. If in fact there exist a 
strong link between economic growth and poverty reduction, then economic reforms that 
accelerate economic growth are the ideal anti-poverty strategies.  It is because of the presumed 
strong link between economic growth and poverty reduction that reforms have been widely 
accepted across the developing world. However, while it is in fact true that economic growth 
associates with poverty reduction, this outcome does not always hold or relationship can be 
weak such that economic growth does not yield substantial declines in the levels of poverty. 
Furthermore, different episodes of growth could have substantially different impact on poverty 
even in the same country. Even more bothersome is that not all economic reforms result in 
significant economic growth and there are cases where reforms have resulted in perverse 
outcomes. 
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 Policymakers seeking to deal with the problem of poverty in developing countries therefore 
have two key policy concerns. The first is to institute economic policy reforms that result in 
economic growth. Second, they should be concerned that the ensuing growth associates with 
substantial gains to the poor—what is referred to as pro-poor growth. This means that 
policymakers must carefully evaluate economic reform proposals so that they prioritize reforms 
that are pro-poor. 
 This paper looks at economic reform experiences of developing and transitional economies  
with respect to growth outcomes and more specifically their impact on poverty. The paper relies 
on existing literature and therefore largely reflects a compilation of state of knowledge on the 
subject of growth and poverty. Nevertheless, I also attempt to present what I consider to be a 
general theory of reforms and pro-poor growth.  The section that follows provides a brief 
summary of reform policies that have been implemented over the last four decades or so in 
developing countries. Section III focuses on meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth.  
Here we briefly outline a number of the common measures of poor growth followed by 
evidence of growth and poverty reduction in a number of countries. It is demonstrated that, 
while growth is generally good for the poor, there are many cases when growth experiences in 
developing countries have not been pro-poor. Section IV provides a discussion of the link 
between reforms and growth and also pro-poor growth.  The general finding is that the impact 
of reforms on growth has varied widely.  While the reforming countries experience higher 
growth, this growth has not been pro-poor.  In addition, the African experience with reforms 
has been disappointing. In Section V, I attempt to formulate what I call a general theory of reform 
and pro-poor growth, or simply a pro-poor growth paradigm. The primary objective is to outline some 
principles that can guide in the design of pro-poor growth policies.  A brief summary of the 
paper is provided in the concluding section. 
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II. Economic Reforms: From Structural Adjustment to Post-Washington Consensus 
The general meaning of the term “reform” is to change direction or to take corrective measures. 
In essence, reforms are prompted by unfavorable state of affairs such as slow growth, high rates 
of poverty, debt crisis, inflation, macroeconomic instability, etc. The goal of reforms is therefore 
to reverse such trends and move the economy to a more favorable growth path.  The nature of 
reforms varies a great deal across countries and also over time. In some cases, reforms involve 
major changes in policy direction such as the shift away from planned economies to market 
economies or from fixed exchange rates to flexible rates. In such cases, the reforms are initiated 
in response to failure of existing policies to achieve say rapid growth or due to excessive 
imbalances in the international trade markets.  Other reforms may be less radical and often 
involve gradual changes such as tax reductions or marginal changes in regulations.  Regardless of 
the nature of reform, they do nevertheless reflect a desire to change the trend as a result of 
observed weaknesses in existing policies.  
 The key focus of economic reforms is the creation of wealth. The debate over wealth 
creation has in turn been guided by some accepted orthodoxy, paradigm or conventional 
economic thinking. Adam Smith’s prescription for free markets was in fact a critique of then 
accepted orthodoxy that considered mercantilism as the best way for nations to accumulate 
wealth.  Likewise, recent economic reforms have been guided by some accepted wisdom or 
orthodoxy about the processes that guide wealth creation. The accepted wisdom about the 
creation of wealth change over time as new information is revealed following implementation of 
specific policies.  This section discusses some of the recent economic reforms in developing 
countries.  
 The first broad economic reforms introduced in developing countries comprise policies that 
are collectively referred to as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). The accepted 
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development paradigm during the period after Second World War was one where central 
planning was considered the best mechanism for resource allocation. The leading development 
economistss of the day including Rostow, Myrdal and others all emphasized the importance of 
the state in development and the inadequacy of a laissez faire market economy in resource 
allocation.   Thus, development theories of the day put a heavy emphasis on the importance of  
government and the dangers associated with market failures as had been shown by Keynes.  
However, over time, these government-led model of development failed in virtually all countries. 
The interventionist polices resulted in a general lack of fiscal discipline and extensive 
intervention in markets.  Governments created inflationary situations as a result of public sector 
deficits and monetary expansion. In addition, countries tended to regulate their exchange rates 
resulting in overvalued currencies and also imposed various controls in both domestic and 
international markets. Likewise, the countries were characterized by high levels of state provision 
of goods and services.  Thus the pre-SAP era was an era of “government” controlled economies 
and maligned prices.  As noted by Goff (2003), these policies resulted in serious instabilities: 
Taken together, these policies severely restricted the scope of market forces: 
limiting the role of the price mechanism and reducing incentives, efficiency and 
innovation. They were also unsustainable: export industries were condemned to a 
lack of competitiveness, leading to balance of payments deficits and the loss of 
foreign exchange reserves. Fiscal deficits would add to the mountain of public 
debt. The country would thus become dependent on repeated loans from the IMF 
and the World Bank for fear of running out of funds and the resulting exchange 
rate crisis and hyper inflation (p. 49). 
 
In response, SAPs were recommended primarily to deal with stabilization and structural change. 
Stabilization policies were meant to create more stable economies by lowering the inflationary 
expectations and reducing the role of the government in determining prices.  Stabilization 
programs involved tighter monetary policies and higher real interest rates, reduction in 
government spending such as subsidies and exchange rate depreciation so as to make imports 
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relatively more expensive and exports cheaper. Policies to change the structure of the economies 
were geared to making economies of developing countries closer to those of developed 
countries and included trade liberalization through the removal of quantitative restrictions, 
privatization of state enterprises and liberalization of the capital markets. Beginning in the 1970 
and 1980s, many developing countries adopted “structural adjustment” reforms that were often 
imposed as conditionalities for loans and other facilities by the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
 During the 1990s, the adjustment policies were followed by deeper and broader set of 
reform policies that are now commonly referred to as the “Washington Consensus” so called 
because they reflected the accepted orthodoxy by  Washington-based development agencies, 
namely, the  Bretton Woods Institutions, US Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank.1  The 
consensus included the following specific reforms—often referred to as the “ten 
commandments” of economic development: 
• Fiscal discipline to reduce deficits, inflation and balance of payments  
• Reordering public expenditures priorities 
• Tax reform so as to have a broad tax base and moderate marginal tax rates 
• Liberalizing interest rates so that interests are determined by market forces 
• Competitive exchange rate 
• Trade liberalization—removal of quantitative restrictions and replacement with low and 
uniform tariffs 
• Liberalization of foreign direct investment or generally openness to foreign investment 
• Privatization of state enterprises 
• Deregulation so as to reduce barriers to entry and exit 
• Property rights—legal security of rights 
 The Washington Consensus was largely influenced by the experiences of the East Asian economies.  
While countries in Latin America and Africa stagnated, had high rates of inflations, large domestics 
                                                 
1 The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson in 1989. 
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and international debt, etc, the Asian countries that had opened up their economies and followed 
policies that were very similar to those of developed countries were prospering.  In addition, several 
empirical studies concluded that countries that pursued market policies grew significantly faster. 
Thus, the East Asian development model was considered a major success and thus it was believed 
that same policies would result in success if adopted by the other developing countries.  During the 
1990s, the Washington Consensus policies dominated reforms in Latin America and Africa. 
 The general thrust of the set of policies referred to as the Washington Consensus involved  
adoption of conservative macroeconomic policies and liberal microeconomic policies.  These 
policies translate in to expanding the role of the market in resource allocation and reducing the role 
of the state to a minimum.  The conventional wisdom that guided these policies was the belief was 
that too much government involvement in the economies of many developing countries was a 
primary hindrance to economic growth.  The consensus recommended a relatively few instruments 
with the primary goal being generating economic growth. 
 By the mid 1990s, the Washington Consensus as a development paradigm had started to lose 
currency. There were concerns that the simple “free market” focus did not yield the positive results 
expected and the Washington Consensus was soon replaced by what came to be known as the post-
Washington Consensus pioneered by Joseph Stiglitz (1998). Stiglitz was critical of the Washington 
consensus largely because of its failure to take into account the importance of the state in the 
development process and also the peculiarities of different countries.  In particular, Stiglitz 
considered the Washington Consensus as having pushed the capabilities of the market too far:  
To be sure, governments can make maters worse. No doubt, the Washington Consensus 
represented, in part, a reaction to the failures of the state in attempting to correct those of 
the market. But the pendulum swung too far in the other direction and for too long. The 
consensus policies often assumed the worst about the nature and capability of governments 
and made that one size fit all. That resulted in a strong bias against basing policy advice on 
an analysis of what interventions are appropriate in what contexts or to build the 
institutions or capacity of states to intervene effectively (Stiglitiz, Post-Washington 
Consensus Consensus, p2.) 
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In the case of Africa, Stiglitz observes that the Washington Consensus policies were unsuitable and 
largely resulted in failure: 
In Africa, the costs of a simple-minded belief in the magic of the market were palpable 
and huge. For example, policy conditionalities imposed on the countries of the region, too 
often focused much too narrowly on liberalization of agricultural prices without 
adequate attention to the pre-requisites to make that effective such as functioning 
markets for inputs and outputs, credit availability and infrastructure (especially roads); 
the insistence on static comparative advantage led to the fallacy of composition 
whereby increasing exports of commodities by many countries led to collapse in their 
prices; financial sector reforms were focused excessively on making interest rates 
market-determined in very thin and rudimentary markets leading often to prolonged 
periods of very high interest rates without improving the availability of credit. (Stiglitiz, 
Post-Washington Consensus Consensus, p3-4). 
 
Stigilitz emphasized the importance of quality institutions, voice and partnerships in governance of 
states and also the links between national and international environment. In short, the post 
Washington Consensus recognizes the important role of government in complementing markets. 
While accepting the importance of markets, recent policy focus also recognizes the importance of 
investing in the poor in areas such as health, education and good governance so that the people can 
be able to take advantage of economic opportunities. The paradigm shift has associated with the 
formulation and implementation of what is referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs). Policies under the PRSPs target economic growth but also prioritize pro-poor spending, 
often requiring ring-fencing specific pro-poor expenditures.  In addition, PRSPs are formulated 
within the context of individual country’s circumstances and call for broad participation of the 
people.  
III. Pro-Poor Growth: Meaning and Measurement 
(i) Meaning of Pro-Poor Growth 
While growth is important, there has been concerns that growth may not necessarily reduce 
poverty substantially and therefore just because a country experiences positive growth is not 
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sufficient to assess whether the poor indeed benefit. Thus, in assessing the impact of growth on 
poor, information on the distribution of gains from growth is necessary. That is, to determine 
whether growth is pro-poor, it is necessary to evaluate how the benefits of growth are shared 
amongst the different income groups. The increased focus on pro-poor growth is a consequence 
of  mounting evidence that for many episodes of growth, gains are  not shared by all members 
of the population and in fact growth may have associated with declining well-being of the 
poor—what may be referred to as immiserizing growth. With the current focus on the 
Millennium Development Goals, there is more emphasis on the concept of pro-poor growth 
which is in essence placing higher weights on the well-being of the poor. In this section, we 
focus on the link between reforms and economic growth, and more specifically, pro-poor 
growth. We begin with a brief discussion of the meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth 
followed by discussion of reforms and pro-poor growth.  
 Pro-poor growth is variously defined as follows:  
• In its simplest interpretation, the concept of “pro-poor growth” implies the type of 
growth that is good for the poor.  If we take this simple definition, then for so long as 
growth associates with a reduction in the proportion of the poor in the population 
(holding the poverty line constant), then it is pro-poor.   
•  Pro-poor growth is also defined as growth  that results in an increase in the incomes of 
the poor. This means that real incomes of the poor between two time periods increases.   
Ravalion and Chen (2003) consider growth to be pro-poor if, and only if the poor people 
benefit in absolute terms.  
• Finally, others define pro-poor growth as one that associates with larger proportionate 
increases in incomes of the poor than the rest of the population.  In other words, this 
definition takes into account the distributional shifts following economic growth. Klasen 
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(2001) uses the term pro-poor growth to mean that the poor benefit disproportionately  
from economic growth. This implies that the proportional income of the poorest quintile 
or those below the poverty line should exceed the average income growth rate. A related 
concept in discussing pro-poor growth is progressivity.  The idea of progressivity is 
commonly used in tax and benefit-incidence literature to mean that benefits are a 
decreasing function of income (or tax burden increases with income).  Gasparini (2005) 
uses the concept of progressivity to capture pro-poor growth if the change in income as 
a share of initial income (growth rate) is a decreasing function of income. Simply, pro-
poor growth under this concept of progressivity is one where the change in income is a 
decreasing function of the initial level of income.  White and Anderson (2001) also 
define pro-poor growth as one where the poor’s share of an income increase is greater 
than their current share of total income or the poor’s share of an increase in income is 
greater than some international benchmark. Simply, these definitions suggest that growth 
is pro-poor if poor’s income grows more than the incomes of the non poor. 
There are many other definitions of pro-poor growth (also referred by some authors as poverty bias 
growth (Hersels (2000), Mcculloch and Bauch (1999)). The key element of these definitions is that 
ensuing growth not only benefits the poor but they benefit disproportionately.  
 (ii) Measuring pro-poor growth 
A number of measures of pro-poor growth have been developed.  These measures seek to capture 
the pro-poorness of growth as defined above. The various measures are either absolute (meaning 
they focus exclusively on what happens to the poor) or relative which implies that the measures look 
at the changes in the well-being of the poor relative to the other income groups.  Some of the 
common pro-poor growth measures and approaches are discussed below. 
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(a) Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
A simple measure of pro-poor growth is the total growth elasticity of poverty defined as the 
proportional  change in the poverty headcount between two time periods for a one percent change 
in mean income.2 If the growth elasticity of poverty (GEP) is greater than 1, then it means that a 
small change in income results in proportionally larger decreases in poverty.  Other things equal, the 
larger the GEP, the larger the reduction in poverty reduction for a given rate of growth—hence 
more pro-poor. This measure is attractive because of its simplicity and the fact that it is not data 
intensive. However, the measure can be misleading because the responsiveness of poverty to growth 
also depends on the initial levels of income and state of income distribution. Poverty may be more 
responsive to change in income when income is low as compared to higher incomes. Thus, the same 
rate of economic growth may appear pro-poor in a low income country but not so in a middle 
income country. Likewise, poverty is less responsive to increases in income if the inequality is 
higher. Consequently, while GEP is a convenient measure, it should be interpreted with caution 
particularly when comparing pro-poorness of growth across countries.  In other words, although the 
elasticities are illustrative, they are sensitive to the location of the poverty line in income distribution 
(Bourguignon 2002, 2003; Ravalion 1997).3 
(b) Rate of Pro-Poor Growth  
The other measure of pro-poor growth takes into account not only the number of poor people but 
also what happens to changes in incomes of the poor. Ravallion and Chen (2003) use Growth 
Incidence Curves (GIC) to measure pro-poor growth.  A GIC shows the rate of growth for a given 
period of time at each percentile of the distribution. If GIC is >0, for particular percentiles, then it 
                                                 
2 The total Growth elasticity of poverty γ is given by [∆H/∆U*u/H], where H is the headcount index and u is the mean 
income. The growth elasticity of poverty is obtained by estimating a regression equation of the following general form: 
Log Pov= α  + β  LogU +  γt + e where Pov is the poverty measured by headcount or consumption, U is the mean 
income, γ is the trend rate of change in income and e is the error term. 
3 Also, the elasticity measure can give quite misleading results. For example, if the  rate of growth is zero and there is a 
small change in poverty (reduction), the measure would imply an infinite growth elasticity of poverty. 
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means that poverty declines for those groups.  Ravallion and Chen propose a numerical indicator of 
pro-poor growth based the mean of the growth rates of poor as a measure of pro-poor growth. If 
the mean growth rate of the poor is positive, then growth is pro-poor and vice versa.  
 For illustration, Table 1 provides some hypothetical data showing three growth scenarios for 
each of the percentiles.  Each of the growth scenarios result in different growth incidence curves as 
shown in Figures 1-3.  For simplicity, we focus on the meaning of the different GICs.  In Figure 1, 
we observe that growth rate is >0 for all percentiles meaning that poverty has fallen for all groups. 
However, the curve is also strictly increasing over all the income groups which suggest increases in 
inequality.  That is, the higher income groups benefit more. The horizontal line shows the mean 
growth rate over entire distribution.  As is evident, the lower income groups have growth rates that 
are below the mean growth suggesting that growth is not pro-poor.  Likewise, in Figure 2, the GIC 
is above zero for entire distribution but the curve is strictly decreasing suggesting that the growth 
associates with decreases in inequality. Furthermore, the growth rates for the poorest groups are 
higher than the mean growth rate which means the poor benefit more than the rich-- hence pro-
poor growth.  Figure 3 shows a case where the middle group benefit most while the lowest and 
richest groups benefit least.  
 Figures 4 and 5 show GICs for China based on Ravalion and Chen (2003). Both figures 
show that growth in China has been high for entire distribution of population. The GIC for the 
period 1990-1999 shows that growth in China was not pro-poor and resulted in increasing 
inequality. On the other hand, for the period 1993-1996, the pattern of growth is different and pro-
poor. This shows that in evaluating pro-poorness of growth, it is important to evaluate different 
time intervals. 
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(c) Pro-Poor Growth Index 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) develop a measure of pro-poor growth, which they call the Pro-Poor 
Growth Index,  that takes into account the effect of growth on income distribution and poverty. 
The premise of this measure is that poverty reduction is dependent on both economic growth and 
changes in income distribution.  Specifically, increases in growth reduce poverty but if such increases 
also associate with increases in inequality, then the magnitude of poverty reduction is lower. That is, 
increases in inequality lowers the poverty reduction effectiveness of growth.   Thus a measure of 
pro-poor growth that does not take into account the effect of changes in inequality on poverty 
reduction will  tend to be biased (over estimate the poverty reduction if inequality had increased). 
 Kakwani and Pernia decompose the proportionate change in poverty (O)  resulting from 1% 
change in growth into two components: 
(a) impact of growth when income distribution does not change (pure growth effects- Og) 
(b) the impact of income distribution when the total income remains constant (pure inequality 
effect-O1) 
                      Such that:      O = Og + O1 
The pure growth effect is negative because growth reduces poverty if inequality is held constant. 
The pure inequality effect can be negative (if inequality decreases) and positive (if inequality 
increases).  They define the Pro-Poor Growth Index (PPGI= Ø ) as  ratio of the total poverty 
elasticity of growth (γ ) to the elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income assuming no 
change in income distribution ( γg) 
                                        Ø =  γ/γg 
Ø is the pro-poor growth index. If  Ф>1, then the growth is pro-poor if   0<Ф<1, although 
economic growth reduces poverty, the inequality effect of economic growth is negative and 
therefore the poor benefit proportionately less than the non-poor.  
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 Table 2 which is borrowed from Kakwani and Pernia shows the computation of PPGI for 
the case of the Lao people’s Republic. For the periods 1992-1993 and 1997-1998, Lao experienced 
impressive growth but this growth episodes were also accompanied with rapid increases in 
inequality. This means that although growth would as expected result in reductions in poverty, the 
pro-poorness of the growth is reduced by increases in inequality.  The overall poverty elasticity was -
0.7 which can be decomposed into pure growth effect (-3.2) and pure inequality effect (2.6). The 
pro-poor growth index is therefore (-0.7/-3.2) = 0.21.  This means that growth was associated with 
reduction in poverty but was not pro-poor. 
(d) Poverty-Equivalent Growth Rate 
Kakwani and Son (2002) extend the PPGI to what they refer to as the Poverty Equivalent Growth 
Rate (PEGR).  Although the PPGI captures the distribution of benefits to the poor and non-poor, it 
does not account for the rates of actual growth rate.  We have observed that increases in income 
reduces poverty but increases in inequality increase poverty. Thus, growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if 
the change in inequality that accompanies growth reduces (increases) total poverty. This means that 
growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if the total elasticity of poverty is greater (less) than the growth 
elasticity of poverty (Kakwani and Son 2002).   The PEGR (γ*) is the growth rate that will result in 
the same level of poverty reduction as the present growth rate γ if the growth process has not been 
accompanied by change in inequality.  The PEGR is obtained by simply multiplying the PPGI by the 
growth rate of mean income: 
                                      PEGR= γ* = PPGI* γ 
Where γ is the growth rate of mean income.  A characteristic of this measure is that proportional 
reduction in poverty is a monotonically increasing function of the PEGR. Growth is pro-poor (anti-
poor) if  γ* is greater (less) than γ. If γ* is between 0 and γ, then growth is accompanied with 
increased inequality but poverty reduces. If γ*  is negative, then such growth is immiserizing and the 
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benefits of growth are offset by increases in inequality.   Kakwani and Son suggest that a country’s 
performance in reducing poverty should be judged on the basis of PEGR and not just by growth 
rate alone. 
 Table 3 and Figure 6 provides some hypothetical data to illustrate the concept of PEGR. 
The data shows the actual growth rate and the corresponding poverty equivalent growth rate. Again, 
the PEGR is here assumed to represent the growth rate that would result in the same level of 
poverty reduction if growth does not result in changes in inequality.  In year 1, the actual growth rate 
is 10% but the PEGR is 6%. This means that the 10% actual growth with the associated inequality 
increases would result in the same level of poverty reduction as 6% growth with no changes in 
inequality.   If actual growth rate is higher than the PEGR (cases 1-3, 9-10), and both are positive, 
then poverty reduces but the growth is not pro-poor. If on the other hand PEGR is greater than 
actual growth and both are positive, then the growth is pro-poor.  For the periods 6-8, the economy 
experiences a recession and the PEGR is lower than the actual growth rates and both are negative 
meaning that the recession hit the poor harder. 
(e)  Poverty Growth Curve 
Son (2003) has proposed another measure of pro-poor growth which he refers to as the Poverty 
Growth Curve (PGC) that is based on the definition of pro-poor growth as growth where the poor 
benefit proportionately more than the rich. The PGC is analogous to the GIC but has some distinct 
properties and uses a higher standard for pro-poor growth.  If we describe the Lorenz curve as L(p) 
as the percentage share of income or expenditure enjoyed by the bottom p percent of the 
population, then the generalized Lorenz Curve is given by µL(p) where µ is the mean income or 
expenditure. If the entire Lorenz Curve shifts upward, then the new distribution is said to exhibit 
second order dominance over the previous distribution.  In this case, if the ∆µL(p) >0 for all p, 
(meaning that the generalized Lorenz Curve  shifts upward) then poverty decreases unambiguously 
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for various measures of poverty (Ω) and for all poverty lines.  Likewise, if the curve shifts 
downward, poverty increases unambiguously (Atkinson 1987).  Son defines the PGC as the growth 
rate of the mean income g(p) of the bottom p percent of the population when the individuals are 
ranked by their per capita income or expenditures.  Thus, if g(p) >0 poverty decreases 
unambiguously and vice versa. If g is the growth rate for the entire population, the growth is pro-
poor if g(p)>g for all p<100. If 0<g(p)<g for all p<100, then growth reduces poverty but is 
associated with increases in inequality so that the poor benefit less than the non-poor.  On the other 
hand, if g(p) <0 for all p<100 and g is positive, then this implies immiserizing growth.  
Table 4 provides some illustrative data and shows growth rate for all percentiles and the 
growth rate of mean income (which is given by growth when p=100).  Case 1 shows that growth is 
positive for all percentiles meaning that poverty decreases unambiguously. However, the growth rate 
for all p<100 is less than the mean growth rate, hence the poor benefit less than the rich and thus 
growth is not pro-poor. Case II shows that growth rate for all p<100 is higher than the mean 
growth rate and as such growth reduces poverty and is also pro-poor. Cases III shows a case where 
the economy experiences a recession but the poor are hit more than the rich. Figure 7 shows the 
Poverty Growth Curve. 
Summary-Pro-Poor Growth Meaning and Measurement 
During the last few years, there has been an explosion in the volume of literature on pro-poor 
growth. The interest is, as noted previously, driven primarily by concerns that the poor do not 
always benefit from growth. The definitions of pro-poor growth therefore generally seek to capture 
the gains by the poor relative to non-poor. As shown, there has been major advances in techniques 
to measure pro-poor growth primarily attributed to Ravalion, Chen, Kakwani and Son. All these 
measures focus primarily on capturing the gains to the poor and also on changes in the income 
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distribution arising from growth. The meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth are of policy 
relevance and emphasizes the importance of looking beyond the aggregates.  
IV. Reforms, Growth and Poverty Reduction  
Before proceeding with an analysis of reforms and growth, we begin by reviewing country 
experiences with economic growth and poverty reduction.  Because the primary objective of 
economic reforms is to achieve economic growth, we first look at the role of growth on poverty 
reduction. Relying on existing studies, we draw some broad conclusions about growth and poverty 
reduction.  We then investigate whether in fact growth is generally pro-poor. 
(i) Growth and Poverty Reduction    
There is now a large volume of empirical studies on the relationship between growth and poverty 
reduction.  These studies typically evaluate elasticity of poverty with respect to changes in 
consumption or income between two time periods (intervals). The expected relationship is that 
growth reduces poverty, hence a negative coefficient.  As noted previously, the size of the elasticity 
of poverty matters in terms of evaluating effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty.   For our 
purposes, we focus on whether growth reduces poverty. 
 Table 5 provides empirical findings of the poverty elasticity of growth for different countries 
and time periods. By and large, the results show that growth associates with poverty reduction. 
However, the elasticities vary widely across countries and with episodes of growth. Low elasticities 
suggest that growth does not reduce poverty substantially. The results presented here basically 
support the well-established fact that growth is good for the poor. Hence, growth is necessary for 
poverty reduction. Nevertheless, this does not mean that growth is necessarily pro-poor as defined 
in this paper. As previously observed, capturing the pro-poorness of growth requires that we look 
more carefully at what happens to the incomes of the poor and also the state of income distribution. 
(ii) Pro-Poor Growth 
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Tables 6,a-d provide summaries of empirical evidence of the pro-poorness of growth for 
various countries using different measures discussed previously.  Table 6a shows results from 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) for a number of Asian countries; Table 6b summarizes results the 
experiences of 18 Africa countries based on a study by Bingsten and Shimeles (2003);  Table 6c 
provides results of a study by Son (2003) that include 84 countries and 241 growth episodes; and 
Table 6d reports the results of a sample of Latin American countries by Gasparani (2005).   Table 7 
which is obtained from Cord et al (2003) provides additional cross country evidence of pro-poor 
growth. The results presented in these studies reveal that many episodes of economic growth are not 
pro-poor. This is true for all measures of pro-poor growth and for all measures of poverty.  In fact, 
the evidence reveals that while episodes of economic growth generally associate with reduction in 
the incidence of poverty, they are not pro-poor.   
(iii) Reforms and  pro-poor growth 
We now turn to the impact of reforms in producing pro-poor growth. In evaluating the impact of 
reforms, four key issues are of interest: 
• In General, are reforms successfully in generating economic growth? 
• Which type of reforms appear to associate most strongly  with economic growth? 
• In cases for which reforms have translated into growth, has that growth been pro-poor? 
• What types of reforms appear to be both good for economic growth and also pro-poor? 
Table 8 provides a schema for evaluating reforms. In as far as growth is concerned, there are 
three possible outcomes: (i) No change in growth, (ii) negative growth and (iii) positive growth. 
Each of these outcomes could also be associated with no change, increase or decrease in poverty 
and inequality.  The direction and magnitude of change of both poverty and inequality determines 
pro-poorness of growth. We can therefore evaluate reforms by classifying their impact on growth, 
poverty and inequality. But evaluating reforms is complicated and requires detailed analysis of 
specific country experiences. For one, although it is true that many developing countries have 
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implemented reforms, it is important to note that commitment to the reforms has varied greatly and 
there has been many cases stop-and-go and outright policy reversals. Thus, it is difficult to isolate 
the failure of policies per se from the inadequacies of the policies and the implementation issues 
themselves.  In addition, the institutional context may influence the success of reforms. Finally,  
policies may yield pro-poor growth in one country and completely opposite results in another The 
point here is that good analysis of reform and pro-poor growth should be on case by case basis.  
Reforms and Growth 
The above concerns not withstanding, for reforms to be pro-poor, they must first result in 
accelerated growth and so the question is whether reforms in developing countries have associated 
with growth. Thus, before we even worry whether growth is pro-poor or not, we need to evaluate 
whether economic reforms have had positive growth trajectory.  
The predominant thrust of reforms in developing countries since the 1980s as embodied in 
the structural adjustment policies and the broad Washington Consensus has been to improve the 
functioning of markets or simply shifting economies to a market orientation. These policies have 
included macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization of domestic and international trade—including 
exchange rate and price liberalization, removal of price distorting policies such as agricultural price 
support, financial sector reforms, privatization and overall reduction of the size and scope of 
government.  If we consider the period since 1980s as the reform period, we can then evaluate the 
growth experiences in the reforming countries. 
 Tables 9 and10 provides data for growth rates for Latin America and Sub-Saharan African 
countries respectively.  Table 9 also provides aggregate growth rates for other countries. The 
aggregate data reveal that the growth experience of Latin America and Africa has been disappointing 
during the reform period. The regions actually experienced higher growth rates during the pre-
reform era. Latin American countries showed some signs of growth during the early 1990s but SSA 
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stagnated.  In fact, data reveals that about 16 countries had lower per capital income in 1994 than in 
1960 (Rodrick 1997).   However, East Asia managed to maintain high growth throughout.  If we 
were then to judge reforms based on the aggregate data, then a broad conclusion is that reforms 
have not been good for growth. However, this is misleading. If we look closely to the growth 
experiences of individual countries in Tables 9 and 10, we find that growth varies widely across the 
countries.  The emerging picture is that there have been wide variations in the growth performance 
with some countries experiencing credible growth while others had disastrous experiences. Data for 
the mid 1990s and early 2000s shows that SSA economies have performed better than previous 
periods achieving a growth rate of 2% in  per capita GDP between 1995 and 1999 (IMF 2005). 
Again, there are wide variations across countries. Thus, it would be misleading to attribute poor 
growth performance to reforms. Still, SSA performance is much lower than other developing 
countries. Appendix 1 shows recent growth performance in Africa. 
 Empirical evidence on the determinants of growth show that controlling for other variables, 
market reforms have had a positive effect on growth (Greenaway and Wright (2001); Barro (1991, 
1996); Fernandez and Montiel (1997), Gregorio and Lee; Rodrik (1997); Dollar (1992); Bruno and 
Easterly (1995); Sachs and Warner (1995); Levine and Zervos (1993), Kimenyi, et al (2003), among 
others).  These studies evaluate the independent effects of policies such as trade liberalization, 
inflation, commercial policies, etc. Thus, the empirical evidence suggest that other things equal, 
market reforms are good for growth.  Countries that have been persistent in solidifying reforms and 
thus score high on measures of quality of policy indices, have other things constant, experienced 
higher growth rates. While countries may experience some initial slow down with the 
commencement of reforms, sustaining and deepening reforms seem to pay off in the long run. Thus 
a general conclusion is that market reforms are good for growth.  For Africa, it appears from 
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evidence that the failure to grow is primarily due to both institutional factors (wars for example) and 
failure to sustain reforms. 
Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth 
We now turn to investigating whether the growth resulting from reforms is pro-poor. We have 
already observed that for many countries, the growth performance has been weak. Thus, regardless 
of whether such growth is pro-poor or not, we would not expect much by way of poverty reduction 
given the values of the growth elasticity of poverty presented earlier.   Evidence reveals that for most 
of the developing countries—especially in SSA, poverty rates generally increased during the reform 
period. In other words, there has not been substantial poverty reduction associated with reforms.  
Early evaluation of the structural adjustment programs for example showed that, even where the 
policies resulted in growth, poverty increased. Table 11 shows the changes in poverty for some of 
the adjusting African countries. The results show that countries like Ghana, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe that scored favorably in terms of macroeconomic policies also experienced increases in 
poverty (see also Ali  ). 
 Szekely (2003) finds that while reforms have had a positive effect on growth in Latin 
America, the growth has also associated with increases in inequality so that the gains to the poor 
have been modest. Thus, growth in Latin America has not been pro-poor. This is consistent to 
results by Gasparini (2005).  If we look at the evidence of pro-poor growth provided in this paper 
(see data discussed in Section III), we find that the growth experiences for most of the reforming 
countries has not been pro-poor.  In some cases, reforming countries have actually experienced 
immiserizing growth. 
Summary: Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth 
An evaluation of reform and growth experiences is complex and linking reforms to pro-poor growth 
is even more so.  The foregoing discussion provides some highlights on the country experiences 
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with reforms, growth and poverty reduction. The broad conclusions that we draw from existing 
evidence can be summarized as follows: 
• Growth is good for poverty reduction 
• Controlling for other variables including institutional features, market reforms are good for 
growth 
• Market reforms supplemented or complemented by state interventions are good for both 
growth and equity and are pro-poor 
• Country growth experiences vary considerably 
• Most growth episodes associate with poverty reduction but are not pro-poor 
• Casual evidence seems to show that where reforms have resulted in growth, the growth has 
not been pro-poor for most countries 
• For Africa, there are two key problems that we should be concerned with: 
- low growth  (or even negative growth); and 
- limited pro-poor growth. 
 
 
V. A  Pro-Poor Growth Paradigm 
 
The ultimate object of poverty reduction is to enhance human development which essentially 
implies improvements in people’s well-being.  Following Sen (1987), I consider well-being to 
incorporate two key aspects—functionings and capabilities.  Functionings refer to the type of life 
people are able to achieve while capabilities refers to the capacity and freedom to achieve and 
choose life or functionings.  From Sen’s insights, we can consider pro-poor growth to be growth 
that expands the opportunities and capabilities of the poor so that they participate more and benefit 
from economic activities.   Thus pro-poor growth policies must necessarily stimulate economic 
activities that the poor are involved in and at the same time must raise their capabilities so that they 
can exploit opportunities. This is not to say that the broad policies such as macroeconomic stability 
are not important. To the contrary, reform policies for growth of the entire economy are necessary 
for poverty reduction. However, we have seen that these policies might not reach the poor and thus 
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we need specific polices for pro-poor growth. Below, I focus on basic principles that I consider 
essential for the achievement of pro-poor growth which I call the Ten Commandments of Pro-Poor 
Growth.  Taken together, these principles encompass what I consider to be general theory of pro-
poor growth policies. 
A. The Poor and Their Activities. 
One simple but crucial concept in policy design is the principle of target efficiency. Policies are most 
effective when they are appropriately targeted.  Within the context of pro-poor growth, it is apparent 
that a possible reason for the failure of the broad reform policies is that they do not target the poor 
effectively. One reason for this is the assumption that effects of policies are effectively transmitted 
to the poor through the market mechanism—which is the basis of many of the market policies.  But 
this process assumes that market signals are transmitted to all sectors and with sufficient speed and 
efficiency so that all markets respond to policy shocks.  In addition, such models implicitly assume 
that markets are well integrated and adjust appropriately.  If this were the case, broad policies can be 
expected to influence the activities of the poor.  Because the idea of pro-poor growth is that the 
poor benefit most from growth, then a pro-poor policy must by design invigorate what the poor do 
much more than the other activities. 
 Consider an economy characterized by sectoral distribution of activities as shown in Table 
12. Assume that a policy shock is introduced in this economy—say liberalization of prices. Except 
for subsistence fishing, the various sectors  respond positively but to varying degrees as reflected by 
the assumed adjustment coefficient (meaning percentage change in economic activity in response to 
the policy shock).  Even if we assumed that poverty was evenly distributed across the sectors, the 
ensuing growth would not be pro-poor as most of the population benefit far less than others. This 
policy, though increasing economic activity also increases the inequality.  The most likely reason for 
the differential outcomes is that some sectors are not strongly integrated. For example the rural 
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subsistence agriculture and urban informal sectors may be only weakly linked to the formal sectors 
of the economy. Because of the fact that markets are not fully integrated, the impact of reform 
policies may not influence some of the markets. Simply, the basic issue here is that we need to know 
and target where the poor people are and what the do (see Mwabu and Thorbecke 2001). I therefore 
propose the following principle for pro-poor reform policies: 
•  Principle 1: Pro-poor reform policies must target activities of which most poor are involved in directly 
rather than relying on leakages from other markets.   
B. Improving the Functioning of Markets for the Poor 
Past reforms have tended to focus on broad policies that improve the functioning of markets 
generally. Trade liberalization and deregulation of the domestic economy all improve on the 
efficiency of markets. But such reforms may have limited impact on the functioning of markets for 
the poor. Just because we liberalize trade does not necessarily imply that the rural agriculture 
markets operate more efficiently. Consequently, pro-poor reforms must focus on those constraints 
that hinder the poor from fully participating in markets. A poor farmer’s main barriers may not even 
be production but taking goods to the markets. Markets for the poor can be significantly enhanced 
for example by simple improvements in rural access roads that make it possible for the farmers to 
engage in bigger rural markets.  
• Principle 2: Pro-poor reform policies must focus on improving the functioning of markets where poor people 
participate. 
C. Exploiting What the Poor have in Abundance—Labor 
A good measure of a pro-poor growth reform must be one that results in increased utilization of 
what marketable resource the poor have in abundance—unskilled labor.  Many reforms that have 
resulted in economic growth have mainly impacted on sectors that require skilled labor.  In essence 
the reforms result in increasing wages of high income earners but neither increases employment or 
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wages of low skill workers.  The result is that those reforms increase inequality and have no 
significant increases in the incomes of the poor.  Pro-poor reforms must therefore target stimulation 
of those labor-absorbing activities which calls for policies that raise production in agriculture and 
labor intensive industries.  Hence the next principle: 
• Principle 3: Pro-poor reform policies should support low-skill, labor intensive economic activities. 
D. Improving Linkages Between Markets 
The fact that reform policies may have generated growth but have had limited impact on poverty 
reduction suggests that markets are weakly linked as suggested above.  One could think of multiple 
markets in the same country and which are poorly linked or at least that there are bottlenecks that 
hinder spillover effects from one sector to another. Because of the poor linkage, some markets 
might experience booms but this does not filter to other markets. Because most macro policies 
operate more directly in formal markets where the well-off participate, growth cannot be pro-poor 
unless the impact of those markets is transmitted to those markets. Likewise, the poor may increase 
production but they may not benefit substantially because they may not be able to reach those other 
markets (for example, a farmer who grows vegetables but is not able to access the wider urban 
markets).   By and large, I consider a key problem of the failure of growth to filter down to the poor 
as due to segmentation of markets. Thus, a way to increase the pro-poorness of growth must seek to 
reduce the degree of market segmentation: 
• Principle 4:  Pro-poor reform policies should seek to reduce market segmentation so that markets for the 
poor are better integrated in the economy which requires improving on the forward and backward linkages. 
E.  Capabilities 
Poverty is directly related to productivity—that is, poor generally have low productivity primarily 
because of lack of appropriate skills. Thus, even when the economy expands, increases in the 
earnings of the poor tend to lag those of skilled workers considerably.  As already noted, a pro-poor 
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growth strategy must translate in large improvements in the earnings of the poor relative to the non-
poor. Because of the fact that the poor start with very low or no skills at all, small investments that 
raise their capabilities can have larger increases in productivity.  It is such response to productivity 
that would translate into pro-poor growth.  Reform policies should therefore include a mixture of 
targeted public expenditure that raises capabilities such as in health, education, skills training, etc.  
Improving the capabilities of the poor raises productivity and gives the poor tools that helps them 
exploit economic opportunities. 
• Principle 5: Pro-poor growth strategy should ring-fence public expenditures for raising capabilities of the 
poor. 
F. Target  Groups Outside the Market 
Within many of the developing countries, there are many groups that operate outside the market—
that is, they are completely cut off from markets. The general reforms that were discussed earlier 
would have absolutely no impact on these groups (adjustment coefficient = 0).  The implication here 
is that there are groups that operate completely outside the market and will not benefit from most of 
the broad macro reforms. As such, a pro-poor growth strategy must seek to bring these groups into 
the realm of markets which may require facilitation to create markets. These groups of poor can only 
benefit if there are specific policies that result in the evolution of markets. 
• Principle 6: Pro-poor growth policies should create mechanisms for enabling those groups that operate 
outside the markets to participate in all forms of  markets (commodity, credit, labor, and land markets) 
G. Food Security 
One simple rule for pro-poor growth should be to focus on ensuring that the poor are insulated 
from hunger. No policy will help the poor out of their state if in fact they are exposed to 
possibilities of starvation. Thus, there has to be a well focused policy that ensures that food is 
available to the poor—meaning improvements in production, distribution, storage, etc.    
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• Principle 7:  Pro-poor reforms should include a food security policy.  
H. Strategies to Deal with vulnerability 
One of the reasons that gains by poor tend to be eroded is because of their exposure to extreme 
risks—drought, floods, disease, etc.  All these random events (and some not so random) hit the 
poor hard resulting in large swings in welfare often eroding any gains achieved from growth during 
normal times.   These may involve early warning systems and appropriate safety nets. 
• Principle 8:  A broad pro-poor growth reform strategy should include policy initiatives that protect 
vulnerable populations from large swings in consumption. 
I. Assets 
A key element of sustainable pro-poor growth has to do with asset accumulation (Kimenyi 1994; 
Kimenyi et al. 1998). Pro-poor growth will be self sustaining if it results in accumulation of assets by 
the poor.  A most important asset for many developing countries is land but there are also many 
other forms of assets that the poor could accumulate.  More often than not, there are many barriers 
to accumulation of assets—from system of rights to pure imperfection in the markets.  Policy 
should therefore focus on removing barriers that make it difficult to accumulate assets. 
• Principle 9: Pro-Poor Growth reforms should include policies that support accumulation of tradable assets 
by the poor.  
J. Governance  
Finally, reforms for pro-poor growth must be founded on good governance.  In particular, the 
reforms must focus on those policies that make it possible for the poor to fully participate in the 
decision making process and be able to hold those in power accountable. This requires broad 
institutional reforms that increase the poors’ voice—basically power diffusion (Kimenyi 2005a and 
2005b).   
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• Principle 10:  Pro-poor growth reforms must include institutional reforms that empower the poor through 
progressive diffusion of power. 
VI. Conclusion: Reform Experiences and Lessons 
This paper has covered broad issues concerning pro-poor growth and economic reform. I have 
discussed the main economic reforms that developing countries have implemented since the 1970s 
and shown that, by and large, these reforms have focused on market reforms.  I have also discussed 
the meaning and measurement of pro-poor growth and also provided evidence of pro-poor growth 
or the lack of it in large cross-section of countries and time periods.  The emerging story is that 
many episodes of growth are not pro-poor and also that although economic reforms seem to have a 
positive effect on growth in those countries that have been steadfast in their reforms, the overall 
impact on growth has been small for most countries. Furthermore, the evidence seems to show that 
where reforms have translated in positive growth, the growth has not been pro-poor.  
 Finally, I have provided 10 basic principles for pro-poor growth. These principles rely on 
casual observations and development literature —looking at what poor people do, where they live, 
what they can offer to the market, how they can increase their productivity, etc.  These principles 
highlight the importance of looking at the poor as people rather than as mere numbers and getting a 
better understanding of the economy and the linkages within sectors and regions.  Pro-poor reforms 
cannot have their intended impact unless there are significant changes in the institutions of 
governance. Finally, pro-poor policies cannot be sustained without workable partnerships between 
markets and states in the ever changing and complex processes of social and economic 
development. 
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Table 1:   Growth and Poverty: Hypothetical Data 
 
 
Percentile Growth1 Growth2 Growth3 
1 1.6 7.8 1.2 
2 2.2 7.5 1.8 
3 2.5 7.0 2.4 
4 3.0 6.0 3.5 
5 3.7 5.0 4.5 
6 4.8 4.0 5.5 
7 6.5 3.2 6.0 
8 7.5 2.8 3.8 
9 7.8 2.2 2.0 
10 8.0 2.0 1.0 
Mean growth 4. 4. 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Growth and Inequality Effects on Poverty Reduction, Lao, PDR 
 
 
 
Poverty Incidence 
   1992- 1993 
   1993-1997 
   % Annual Change 
Headcount 
Ratio 
45.0 
38.4 
-3.1 
Poverty Gap 
Ratio 
11.3 
10.3 
-1.8 
Severity of 
Poverty 
4.2 
4.0 
-0.9 
Poverty Elasticity -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 
Explained by 
   Growth 
   inequality 
 
-3.2 
2.6 
 
-4.2 
3.8 
 
-2.9 
2.7 
Pro-poor Growth Index 0.21 0.09 0.07 
 
 
Source: Kakwani and Pernia (2000) 
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Figure 1: Growth Incidence Curve-Case 1 
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Figure 3: Growth Incidence Curve-Case 3 
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Figure 4:  Growth Incidence Curve for China, 1990-1999 
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Figure 5: Growth Incidence Curve for China, 1993-1996 
 
 
 
 
 37 
Table  3: Poverty Equivalent Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  4: Poverty Growth Curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Actual growth PEGR 
1 10.00 6.00 
2 9.00 6.00 
3 7.00 5.00 
4 4.00 5.00 
5 4.00 6.00 
6 -1.00 -0.50 
7 -0.50 -0.10 
8 -0.50 -0.80 
9 4.00 2.00 
10 6.00 3.00 
Percentile Case I Case II Case II 
10 7.50 6.00 -3.45 
20 7.00 5.60 -3.12 
30 6.80 5.40 -3.00 
40 6.40 5.20 -2.85 
50 6.20 5.19 -2.50 
60 6.00 5.00 -2.20 
70 4.85 4.20 -2.00 
80 4.60 4.00 -1.80 
90 4.00 3.60 -1.50 
100 8.00 2.50 -1.00 
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Figure 6: Equivalent Growth Rate 
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Table 7: Poverty Growth Curve 
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Table 5: Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
 
STUDY Countries  Periods/Intervals Growth 
Elasticity  
Of Poverty 
Adams 2003 50 countries 101 - 2.59 
Ravalion and Chen 2003 42 countries 64 - 3.12 
Bruno, Ravalion and Squire 20 countries - -2.12 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) Korea 1994-95 -3.10 
 Lao 1992/93-97/98 -0.70 
 Philippines 1994-97 -2.50 
 Thailand 1994-96 -3.10 
 Vietnam 1992/93-97/98 -1.10 
Pasha and Palanivel (2004) Bangladesh 1980s 
1990s 
-0.29 
-0.81 
 Cambodia  1990s -2.31 
 China 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-0.18 
-1.26 
-1.09 
 India 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-2.15 
-0.60 
-0.77 
 Indonesia 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-1.33 
-1.35 
0.72 
 Lao PDR 1990s -1.37 
 Malaysia 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-1.26 
-1.36 
0.63 
 Nepal 1980s 
1990s 
0.33 
0.27 
 Pakistan 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-2.73 
-0.38 
2.01 
 Sri Lanka 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-0.30 
-2.28 
1.24 
 Thailand 1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
-1.02 
0.10 
-0.63 
 Vietnam 1990s -1.18 
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Table 5 Cont.: Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
 
STUDY Countries  Periods/Intervals Growth 
Elasticity  
Of Poverty 
Christiaensen, Demery and 
Paternostro 
Ethiopia 1994-1997 - 0.56 
 Ghana 1992-1999 -0.95 
 Madagascar 1993-1997 
1997-1999 
1993-1999 
-0.27 
-4.50 
-0.11 
 Mauritania 1987-1995 -0.82 
 Nigeria 1992-1996 -1.30 
 Uganda 1992-1997 -1.21 
 Zambia 1991-1996 
1996-1998 
-0.58 
0.37 
Gasparini (2005) Argentina 1992-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2003 
1992-2003 
73.7 
-6.4 
-0.3 
-3.6 
 Chile 1990-1994 
1994-1998 
1998-2000 
1990-2000 
-1.4 
-1.4 
-4.4 
-1.3 
 Paraguay 1997-1999 
1999-2001 
2001-2002 
1997-2002 
-0.4 
-3.3 
-4.1 
-0.6 
 Uruguay 1989-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2003 
1989-2003 
11.4 
4.7 
-3.8 
-5.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
Table 6a: Pro-Poor Growth 
Study Country/Region Measure Interval Value Pro-poor 
Kakwani 
and Pernia 
(2000) 
Korea Pro-poor 
growth index 
(PPGI) 
1994-1995 1.14 yes 
 Lao PPGI 92/93-97/98 0.21 no 
 Philippines PPGI 1994-1997 0.67 no 
 Thailand PPGI 1994-1996 0.64 no 
 Vietnam PPGI 1992/93-
97/98 
0.84 no 
 
 
Table 6b: Pro-Poor Growth in Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6c: Pro-Poor Growth- International (Source- Son (2003)) 
Study Country/Region Measure Interval %Pro-
poor 
Bingsten and 
Shemels 
18 African 
Countries 
White and 
Anderson 
67 spells 55% 
Bingsten and 
Shemels 
Lao Kakwani and 
Pernia 
67 spells 40% 
Growth Type Positive Growth Negative Growth Total 
 
Pro-poor 
84 11 95 
Not pro-poor 71 23 94 
Immiserizing 9 0 9 
Inconclusive 35 8 43 
Total 199 42 241 
 42 
Table 6d: Pro-poor growth in Latin America 
Country Measure interval Value Pro-poor 
Ravalion and Chen 1992-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2003 
1992-2003 
-7.1 
-15.1 
1.8 
-8.0 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Argentina 
Poverty Equivalent 
Growth rate 
1992-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2003 
1992-2003 
-8.3 
-17.3 
-3.5 
-8.6 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Ravalion and Chen 1990-1994 
1994-1998 
1998-2000 
1990-2000 
8.8 
2.5 
-1.9 
4.0 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Chile 
Poverty Equivalent 
Growth rate 
1990-1994 
1994-1998 
1998-2000 
1990-2000 
5.0 
4.4 
-1.2 
4.1 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes  
Ravalion and Chen 1997-1999 
1999-2001 
2001-2002 
1997-2002 
-16.1 
16.4 
-30.0 
-7.8 
No 
Yes 
No 
No  
Paraguay 
Poverty Equivalent 
Growth rate 
1997-1999 
1999-2001 
2001-2002 
1997-2002 
 
 
 
-6.5 
 
 
 
No  
Ravalion and Chen 1989-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2003 
1989-2003 
-4.8 
5.9 
-12.1 
-3.7 
No 
Yes 
No 
No  
Uruguay 
Poverty Equivalent 
Growth rate 
1989-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2003 
1989-2003 
-4.5 
13.5 
-14.5 
-4.0 
No 
Yes 
No 
No  
 
 
Source: Gasparini (2005).
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Table 7: Cross Country Evidence of Pro-Poor Growth 
Negative Growth Inequality Rises Positive Growth/Inequality Rises 
Anti-Poor 
Recession 
Yrs g g20 
Broadly Shared 
Growth 
Yrs g g20 
Not Pro-
poor By 
Any 
Definition 
Yrs g g20 
Poland 20 -0.2 -1.4 Korea, Rep 32 6.7 6.6 Costa Rica 35 1.6 -0.1 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep 
15 -0.4 -0.7 
Taiwan, 
China 
31 6.3 6.2 Tanzania 27 1.5 -2.1 
Slovak 
Republic 
10 -0.4 -0.5 
Hong Kong 
China 
20 5.8 5.2 Bulgaria 10 1.5 -3.5 
Niger 32 -0.6 -1.3 Singapore 20 5.4 5.2 Panama 26 1.4 -2.3 
Sierra 
Leone 
21 -0.8 -7.7 China 15 5.0 1.6 Nigeria 38 1.2 -0.5 
Zambia 37 -1.0 -2.7 Malaysia 25 4.7 4.1 
Dominica
n Republic 
20 1.0 -0.2 
Estonia 10 -1.7 -6.2 Thailand 36 4.2 3.1 
El 
Salvador 
30 0.7 -1.2 
Latvia 10 -4.2 -7.4 Mauritius 11 3.7 1.6 Senegal 31 0.2 -0.5 
Russian 
Federation 
10 -5.6 -14.3 Brazil 33 2.5 0.3 Ethiopia 14 0.2 -1.2 
    Colombia 31 2.3 2.1     
    Mexico 38 2.1 0.9     
    Ecuador 26 1.7 0.3     
    Philippines 40 1.5 0.5     
    Chile 24 1.4 1.1     
    Peru 33 0.4 0.1     
Negative Growth/Inequality Falls Positive Growth/Inequality Falls 
Pro-Poor 
Recession 
Yrs g g20 
Pro-Poor 
Biased Growth 
Yrs g g20  Yrs g g20 
Guyana 37 -0.4 -0.1 Gabon 15 7.7 9.0 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
31 1.8 2.1 
Jordan 17 -0.6 1.0 Indonesia 35 3.7 4.4 India 34 1.8 2.2 
Belarus 10 -1.8 -1.1 Tunisia 25 3.4 3.6 
Banglades
h 
32 1.3 1.5 
Madagascar 33 -2.1 -1.7 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep 
32 2.8 4.5 Nepal 18 1.2 3.9 
    Ghana 10 2.4 4.3 Jamaica 35 1.1 1.5 
    Sri Lanka 32 2.3 3.4 Honduras 28 0.5 1.3 
    Hungary 31 2.2 2.7 Bolivia 22 0.3 1.0 
 
   Turkey 26 2.2 2.9 
Venezuela, 
RB 
31 0.1 0.1 
    Pakistan 32 2.2 2.8     
 
Cord, Lopez, and Page (2003 
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Figure 8:  Schema for Analyzing Reform, Growth, Poverty and Inequality 
 
Growth outcomes Reforms have no 
impact on growth of 
the economy. Growth 
trajectory before and 
after reform remains 
the same 
Reforms result in 
recession. Growth 
trajectory after reform 
lower than before 
reforms 
Reforms result in 
growth. The growth 
trajectory after reforms 
higher than before 
reform 
Poverty rate constant Poverty rate constant Poverty rate constant 
Poverty rate decreases  Poverty rate decreases Poverty rate decreases 
Impact on Poor  
Poverty rate increases 
 
Poverty rate increases Poverty rate increases 
Inequality constant Inequality constant Inequality constant 
 
Inequality decreases Inequality decreases Inequality decreases 
 
Impact on Inequality 
Inequality increases Inequality increases Inequality increases 
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Table 9: Growth in Latin America 
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Table 11: Adjustment and Poverty in Africa 
Country Head count ratio 
1985% 
Headcount 
Ration 1999% 
Change in 
poverty(% points) 
Change in 
Macro policies 
(score) 
Cote d’Ivoire 40.31 45.93 5.62 -1.3 
Ghana 20.00 33.49 4.49 2.2 
Kenya 53.17 58.83 5.66 0.5 
Mauritania 32.17 35.52 3.35 0.5 
Rwanda 31.59 37.94 6.35 -0.2 
Senegal 49.65 54.75 5.10 0.5 
Tanzania 53.53 59.79 6.26 1.5 
Uganda 37.10 44.69 7.59 0.2 
Zambia 48.53 52.54 4.01 -0.3 
Zimbabwe 56.71 62.26 10.55 1.0 
Source: World bank 1994 
Table 12:  Evaluating Impact of Policy 
Sector Population involved in 
activity 
Adjustment coefficient  
Industrial  5 15 
Small and micro enterprises 10 6 
Commercial agriculture 5 20 
Subsistence crop farming 55 2 
Subsistence animal husbandry 15 1 
Commercial fishing 5 10 
Subsistence fishing 5 0 
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Appendix 1: African Growth: 1960-2003 
 
